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This article is an attempt at bridging the gap between economic history and 
development economics in analyzing the East Asian industrialization during 
the latter half of the twentieth century.  It re-interprets Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s ‘patterns of industrialization’ and discusses methods to 
extend a historical model to different historical contexts.  It then compares 
four East Asian countries, namely, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore in terms of Gerschenkronian substituting strategy and 
complementing strategy.  It also examines the transitions of those catching-
up economies and explores the future of the catching-up strategies. 
 
 
  The industrialization of East Asia during the latter half of the twentieth century has 
aroused great interest among development economists, but has been rarely studied by 
Western economic historians, with the exception of the Japanese ‘miracle’, now itself 
an historical fact.  On the other hand, development economists scarcely have tried 
systematically to apply insights from economic history to the analysis of the East Asian 
industrialization, despite their frequent quotations from historical studies.  This paper is 
an attempt at bridging this gap between economic history and development economics.  
It starts from re-interpreting Alexander Gerschenkron’s model of late industrialization 
and discusses some methodological issues in extending historical models to different 
historical contexts.  It then analyzes four East Asian countries, namely, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore by examining the influences that brought about 
recurrences of, and deviations from, Gerschenkron’s patterns.  It extends the analysis to 
the problem of institutional transition as catching-up economies become mature and   2
more fully open to the forces of globalization, and explores some issues regarding the 
future of catching-up strategies. 
 
GERSCHENKRON’S ‘PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIALISATION’ 
  Gerschenkron’s model, what he loosely calls ‘patterns of industrialization’, is a 
three-country paradigm mainly derived from the experiences of Britain, Germany, and 
Russia in the nineteenth century.  He identifies distinctive institutions spearheading 
industrialization as follows: (1) In Britain, the forerunner who pioneered the Industrial 
Revolution, the accumulated private wealth of capitalists was a major source of finance 
and individual entrepreneurs played a central role in industrialization.  (2) In Germany, 
a moderately backward country, ‘the universal banks’ played a major role in financing 
industrialization and organizing the private sector.  (3) In Russia, an extremely 
backward country, the state directly mobilized financial resources and created new 
industries.  From these patterns, Gerschenkron makes a sweeping generalization: “The 
more backward a country’s economy, the greater was the part played by special 
institutional factors ... [and] the more pronounced was the coerciveness and 
comprehensiveness of those factors”.
1  
According to Gerschenkron, this pattern was a combined consequence of (1) the 
technological trend of the day, (2) different ‘degrees of backwardness’, and (3) the 
necessity and willingness on the part of the latecomers to directly compete with 
forerunners.  He observes another pattern, that is, “[t] he more backward a country’s 
economy, the more pronounced was the stress in its industrialization on bigness of both 
                                                 
1 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, p. 354.   3
plant and enterprise ... [and] the greater was the stress upon producers’ goods as against 
consumer goods”.
2  This was because, during the latter half of the nineteenth century 
when Germany and Russia embarked on industrial catching-up, technological progress 
was most rapid in the heavy industries and the “evolution of technology and changing 
composition of industrial output induced growing capital-output ratios and made for 
increases in the optimal size of plant”.
3  And “it was largely by application of the most 
modern and efficient techniques that backward countries could hope to achieve success, 
particularly if their industrialization proceeded in the face of competition from the 
advanced country”.
4  In a nutshell, the catching-up strategy of the latecomers in Europe 
was to focus on the most technologically dynamic industries of the day and leapfrog the 
forerunners in size of plants and enterprises.   
Different institutional patterns across countries were a direct result of this catching-up 
strategy.  British industrialists were forerunners in industrialization and did not face 
strong international competition.  The technological trend during the First Industrial 
Revolution was also not so much towards increasing capital-output ratios as that during 
the Second Industrial Revolution when Germany and Russia began their catching-up 
efforts.  It was thus enough for the British commercial banks to provide industrialists 
with only operating or working capitals.  
However, Germany and Russia required special institutions to mobilize scarce 
resources in order to implement their catching-up strategies.  The universal banks 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 354. 
3 Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian Mirror, p. 113. 
4 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, p. 9.   4
carried out this role in Germany, a moderately backward country, because the banking 
sector had already developed to a certain level although the country was far behind 
Britain in industrialization and per capita income.  In Russia, an extremely backward 
country where “the standards of honesty in business were so disastrously low ... [and] 
fraudulent bankruptcy had been almost elevated to the rank of a general business 
practice”, there was little to expect from the private sector.
 5  The Russian state took 
over the entire role of devising a catching-up strategy and implementing it. 
It should be noted that a main driver in Gerschenkron’s schema is competition among 
nations.  If Germany and Russia were content to remain in dependent status, they would 
not have needed to adopt this strategy, which was certain to exert great strains in their 
societies.  The strategy was pursued because they wanted and needed to compete with 
Britain in terms of industrial and military might.  In a world where industrialization had 
come to exist, economic backwardness was also a threat to national security.  
Gerschenkron’s central concept of ‘substitutes’ was derived from this competition for 
supremacy and ensuring security among the European powers.  The different strategies 
and institutions adopted by the latecomers were substitutes for the lack of the supposed 
‘prerequisites’ of development like capital, technologies, or efficient financial 
intermediaries, which were present in the forerunners.  In this respect, we may name 
this Gerschenkronian type catching-up process as a ‘substituting strategy’. 
  There are three major obstacles in applying Gerschenkron’s schema to the late 
industrializations of the twentieth century.  First, it does not tell us much about the cases 
of failed industrialization which stemmed from ‘growth-retarding’ conditions although 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 19-20.   5
Gerschenkron acknowledges this as ‘the most important aspect of the problem of 
limitations’.
6  In his analysis of the European industrialization, Gerschenkron refers to 
Bulgaria as a case in point.  But, even in Italy and Austria, which he regards as cases of 
bank-led catching-up in a moderately backward economy, it is often pointed out that 
their state administrations acted as ‘obstacles’ to industrial growth.
7  In the twentieth 
century, a larger number of failures in catching-up can be attributed to shortcomings of 
the state.
8  
Secondly, Gerschenkron’s schema does not deal with the cases of dependent 
development.  It is possible that some countries can proceed with industrialization with 
little urgent need for direct competition with the forerunners.  A case in point 
acknowledged by Gerschenkron, as a clear exception to his model, is Denmark.  The 
country did not have ‘sudden spurts of industrialization’ or any ‘peculiar emphasis on 
heavy industries’ because it had “great opportunities for agricultural improvement that 
were inherent in the proximity of the English market”.
9  In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century in Europe, this kind of international specialization might have been 
evident only in agriculture.  But a pronounced trend in the latter half of the twentieth 
century was the ever-increasing process of globalization, which has enlarged room for 
the latecomers to grow through utilizing international specialization in the 
manufacturing sector, as shall be elaborated later. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 362. 
7 Trebilcock, The Industrialization of Continental Power, p. 335-43. 
8 For instance, see Hirschman, “The Political Economy”. 
9 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, p. 16.   6
The third limitation has to do with the role of the banks in ‘moderately backward’ 
countries.  Gerschenkron attaches great importance to the role played by the universal 
banks, arguing that they were “perhaps the greatest organizational innovation in the 
economic history of the century”.
10  He tested his hypothesis against the case of Italy 
and found it worked to his satisfaction.  He also argued that the banks in other 
moderately backward European countries like Belgium, France, Austria and 
Switzerland played similar roles, though in varying degrees.  Many historians agree 
with Gerschenkron in his observation that the universal banks played a central role in 
the German take-off in the nineteenth century.
11  But there are still strong reservations 
in the validity of his approach in other moderately backward European countries except 
Belgium.
12  If we consider non-European cases, his pattern becomes more problematic.  
The role of the banks in the U.S. was never so prominent as in Germany though it was 
important in some stages of growth and in some parts of the American economy.
13  It is 
also difficult to find the latecomers in the twentieth century where the banks played 
such a leading role in industrialization as in Germany. 
  However, it seems to me that these limitations are not quite ‘fatal’ as an 
interpretative tool for the following reasons.  First, Gerschenkron’s schema is 
constructed as an economic model.  As an astute historian, he never belittles the 
                                                 
10 Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian Mirror, p. 102. 
11 Tilly, “Germany,” p. 181-82; Landes, The Unbound Prometeus, p. 350; Henderson, 
The Rise of German Industrial Power, p. 113; and Trebilcock, op. cit., p. 92-104. 
12 For a summary of this, refer to Sylla, “The Role of Banks”. 
13 Ibid.; and Chandler, Invisible Hand and “The United States”.   7
importance of political factors in the historical process.
14  But he chooses to focus on 
economic explanations of late industrialization.
15  This is why he distinguishes what he 
calls the ‘negative’ role of the state, which is “in the nature of creating a suitable 
framework for industrial development”, from “promoting it directly” which can be 
named the ‘positive’ role of the state, and incorporates only the latter in his model.
16  
Thus, different institutions, i.e., the British (unorganized) market, the German universal 
banks and the interventionist Russian state, are compared as functional substitutes.  The 
negative role of the state is excluded because it can be carried out only by the state and 
therefore neither the banks nor the market can be its functional substitute.  The schema 
strongly suggests an active role of the state for extremely backward countries, but it is 
not geared to explaining why the state carried out this role in some countries and not in 
others.  This kind of limitation is inherent in any model since there is no such thing as a 
universal model that can explain everything.
17  
Secondly, Gerschenkron’s model is constructed at an intermediate level of 
abstraction by retaining the temporal and spatial boundaries of nineteenth-century 
                                                 
14 Gerschenkron therefore stresses the importance of institutional changes like the 
emancipation of the peasants and judicial reforms, in the industrial take-off in France, 
Germany, and Russia.  See Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, passim. 
15 In the same vein, Max Weber argues “a phenomenon is ‘economic’ only insofar as 
and only as long as our interest is exclusively focused on its constitutive significance in 
the material struggle for existence”.  See Weber, Methodology, p. 65. 
16 Gerschenkron, op. cit., p. 19. 
17 For the futility of searching for such universal laws, refer to Weber, op. cit..   8
Europe.  So we should consider changes in technologies and institutions when we apply 
it to different times and spaces.  It is not profitable to extend the particular technological 
trends or particular forms of institutions reflected in Gerschenkron’s schema into more 
modern times.
18  For instance, the heavy industries were no longer a new and 
technologically dynamic force in the latter half of the twentieth century, although they 
still provided some latecomers with a springboard for take-off.  The growing 
importance of a ‘complementing strategy’ in the East Asian industrializations in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, which primarily exploits any matching relationships 
between forerunners and latecomers, represents a new source of technological 
opportunities in the international development process.  In extending a historical model, 
we should explicitly take the evolution of technologies into account. 
The same can be said about institutions.  Institutional innovations are results of 
historical development within a country and also of institutional learning across 
countries.  For countries that industrialized later than Germany, therefore, the functions 
of the universal banks can be assigned to other institutions.  One reason why 
Gerchenkron’s view of moderately backward countries has rarely been extended by 
later scholars lies in the absence of the dominant role of the universal banks in other 
countries.  But if we turn our attention towards finding ‘functional substitutes’ in 
                                                 
18 Gerschenkron himself emphasises this aspect as follows: “We deal in particular or 
existential propositions.  It is the very nature of an historical hypothesis to constitute a 
set of expectations which yields enlightenment and increases the stock of our empirical 
knowledge within a spatially and temporally limited zone” (Europe in the Russian 
Mirror, p. 130).   9
different contexts, it is not difficult to see a recurrence of the Gerschenkronian patterns.  
The zaibatsu or the keiretsu in Japan, or the chaebols in Korea are cases in point.  These 
institutions, generally termed as ‘business groups’, mobilized resources and coordinated 
industrial expansion through non-market transactions within the private sector, as shall 
be discussed later. 
  Thirdly, related to the above, a historical model is different from a scientific 
hypothesis that is rejected by the growing incidence of ‘exceptions’.  It is context-
specific and the so-called exceptions are in many cases results of applying the model to 
different contexts.  The best a historical model can achieve is to offer enlightenment in 
understanding other situations by allowing us to view more clearly both regularities and 
deviations. In this respect, Gerschenkron argues that “[to] determine the delimitations 
[of a historical model is] ... on the contrary its reinforcement as a tool of historical 
understanding”.
19  As shall be elaborated below, an extension of Gerschenkron’s model 
in this spirit may reassert a large part of its significance in understanding the late 
industrialization in the twentieth century. 
 
INTERPRETING THE EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALISATION 
  East Asia during the latter half of the twentieth century is a fertile ground for the 
extension of Gerschenkron’s three-country paradigm. Like the U.K. in the nineteenth 
century, the U.S. was an incontestable technological leader by the end of World War II 
and its technological leadership provided other countries with a strong impetus for 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 130.   10
catching-up.
20 Japan had already progressed in its industrialization but was still far 
behind the U.S., allowing us to place it as a ‘moderately backward’ country.  It was 
determined to catch up with the U.S. as much as Germany was with the U.K. in the 
nineteenth century.  East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) like Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore followed suit as distant latecomers to Japan, like ‘extremely 
backward’ countries in Europe in the nineteenth century.  The three country groups 
were clearly distinguished by relative ‘degree of backwardness’ and closely interacted 
with each other.  We will below compare patterns of catching-up in these countries in 
terms of Gerschenkronian substituting strategy and complementing strategy. 
  
The keiretsu and the developmental state in Japan 
  The catching-up experience of Japan during the postwar period can be properly 
understood in terms of the Gerschenkronian substituting strategy.  Japanese companies 
attempted to compete directly with their forerunners in the U.S., and caught up with 
them by focusing on the most technologically dynamic industries of the day and by 
leapfrogging in plant size and investment.  A typical case is the iron and steel industry 
just as it was in Germany in the nineteenth century.  The electronics industry, especially 
the semiconductor industry, shows a similar pattern, though with some deviations due to 
different technological imperatives in that industry. 
What is striking in the Japanese catching-up process in the iron and steel industry is 
that the country became the first in history to rise to the position of world leader without 
benefiting from raw materials endowment in the national or neighboring economies.  
                                                 
20 See Abramovitz, “Catching-Up”; and Maddison, Dynamic Forces.   11
This was mainly due to the application of the ‘Nishiyama model’.  In 1950, Nishiyama, 
then the head of Kawasaki Steel, proposed that the newly established Chiba Works 
should “be equipped with the world’s most advanced technologies in the best factory 
layout” in order to “compete internationally”, that is , on a global scale.
21  This meant 
the establishment of ‘bigger and bigger’ plants since the technological trend in the 
industry was still towards increasing economies of scale.  This Gerschenkronian 
strategy was combined with a Japanese peculiarity, i.e., its lack of domestic raw 
materials.  Nishiyama located the new plants ‘on the sea-coast with deep-water ports’, 
aiming at reducing costs in importing raw materials and exporting intermediate and 
final products.  Other Japanese producers followed suit.  It was mainly the result of the 
adoption of the Nishiyama model that Japan possessed the eight biggest steel mills in 
the capitalist world by 1977.
22    
A similar leapfrogging strategy was practiced in the semiconductor industry.  As in 
the iron and steel industry, the scale of production in the semiconductor industry 
increases rapidly and it is therefore promising for latecomers to embark on a larger-
                                                 
21 Yonekura, “The Postwar Japanese Iron and Steel Industry”, p. 214. 
22 See Yonekura op. cit.; Hogan, World Steel; and Allen, Japan's Economic Expansion.  
Some researchers, like Lynn in How Japan Innovates, emphasize the importance of the 
Japanese early adoption of new technologies like the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) and 
continuous casting (CC).  But the Nishiyama model was already formulated and 
implemented in 1950 before the introduction of BOF and CC in the late 1950s.  In this 
respect, the early adoption of BOF and CC can be said facilitating factors in Japanese 
catching-up in the iron and steel industry.   12
scale of capital investment in their bids to outperform forerunners.  However, as new 
products and processes emerge rapidly, capital equipment needs to be replaced 
continually and large-scale investment in research and development (R&D) must be 
carried out continuously.  So the catching-up process in the semiconductor industry is a 
much more continuous and prolonged affair.  Japanese producers made their play in this 
‘high-tech’ industry by focusing on DRAMs, a segment with high capital intensity, and 
by outperforming their forerunners in the investment ‘race’, most remarkably during the 
period of recessions.
23 
The major institutions in applying this substituting strategy were the keiretsu system 
and the developmental state.  Compared to Germany in the nineteenth century, the role 
of the state was certainly more important in Japan.  On the global level, the economic 
role of the state was significantly enhanced with the wide adoption of Keynesian fiscal 
and monetary policies in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Moreover, the situation 
of the Japanese state after the defeat in the Second World War was historically unique.  
Its role in international politics was severely restricted and the only remaining option to 
enhance the nation’s prestige was economic development.  The relative autonomy of the 
state over domestic interest groups was also significantly increased “[w]ith the zaibatsu 
weakened, the military smashed, and the landlords dispossessed, but with the 
                                                 
23 The average ratio of capital spending to sale of U.S. producers remained only 12% 
during the period 1973-78 but the ratio of Japanese producers was 17.8% during the 
same period.  The same pattern was repeated in the 1985/86 recession. See Gregory, 
Japanese Electronics, p. 95, 209; Hobday, “Corporate Strategies”, p. 235-36; and 
Flaherty and Itami, “Finance”.   13
bureaucracy untouched”.
24  Hence the emergence of ‘the developmental state’:  
economic growth became the prime objective of the state and the state was equipped 
with the power to pursue that objective.  The Japanese state not only applied a variety of 
macroeconomic stimuli to its industries but also employed comprehensive industrial 
policies.
25 
However, it seems that a more prominent vehicle in the finance and organization of 
industrial expansion in Japan was the keiretsu.  The pre-war zaibatsu had already 
developed substantial technological and organizational capability during the heavy 
industrialization of the 1930s and the subsequent wartime efforts.  Although production 
facilities in Manchuria were cut off and many of those in Japan were destroyed, 
experienced managers and engineers, and trained workers were still abundant after the 
war.  Once constraints imposed by the Allied Forces were removed with the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950, the former zaibatsu system was revived in the form of the 
keiretsu system and initiated industrial expansion on a broad front.   
For instance, the steel industry rapidly emerged as a major export machine mainly as 
a result of fierce domestic competition among the keiretsu, despite the fact that the 
government was initially critical of its capacity expansion.
26 The automobile industry’s 
                                                 
24 Cumings , “The Origins”, p. 64. 
25 See Johnson, MITI”; Allen, A Short Economic History; Okuno-Fujiwara, “Industrial 
Policy”. 
26 The MITI at first opposed Nishiyama’s plan, regarding it ‘as an impossible dream’, 
and defined the iron and steel industry as an ‘inappropriate exporting industry’.  See 
Yonekura, op. cit., p. 213-19.   14
phenomenal growth can be also attributed largely to competition within the private 
sector.
27 The consumer electronics industry in Japan rapidly overtook its U.S. 
counterpart from the late 1950s without any particular assistance from the 
government.
28 The system of the vertical keiretsu was also an important institutional 
feature that enabled catching-up in the semiconductor industry, although the state’s 
involvement in organizing collaborative research, especially in the VLSI Project in 
1976, can be regarded here as a facilitating factor.
29 This supremacy of private initiative 
is more apparent if we compare the Japanese catching-up process with those of later-
comers like Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
30 
                                                 
27 In 1963, MITI tried to introduce the “Special Industrial Promotion Measures 
Temporary Act”, attempting to force mergers and specialisation in the passenger car 
market, as well as in special steels and petrochemicals, regarding them as 
internationally uncompetitive.  The measure provoked heated controversies in Japan and 
did not pass the Diet.  If this act had been passed, Honda Motor would have been barred 
from producing passenger cars.  See Kawahara, The Origin of Competitive Strength; 
and Morikawa, “Japan”. 
28 Since the late 1950s, “virtually all the revolutionary innovations in consumer 
electronics products ... have come from Japanese industry”, according to Gregory, 
Japanese Electronics, p. 7.   
29 Refer to Uenohara, “Background”; Flaherty and Itami, op. cit.; Gregory, op. cit.; 
Borrus, “Trade and Development”; and Shin, The Economics of the Latecomers.  
30 In a similar context, Patrick and Rosovsky argue that “the main impetus to growth has 
been private ...  Government intervention generally has tended (and intended) to   15
A principal role of the keiretsu lay in the provision of capital, just as had been the 
case with the German universal banks of the nineteenth century.  The keiretsu facilitated 
high-speed economic growth through ‘interlocked shareholdings’, internal resource 
transfers, loan guarantees and other in-house services.  In the iron and steel industry, 
previous zaibatsu ties were strengthened mainly for the purpose of finance and new ties 
were established within the keiretsu.
31  In the automobile industry and the electronics 
industry, economies of scope resulting from the structure of business grouping were 
also important.  
However, the Japanese keiretsu and the German banks differ in their coordinating 
power.  In Germany, the banks were de facto the center of German capitalism.  They not 
only provided industry with capital but also led industry-wide reorganization like 
promoting cartel association or vertical integration between independent producers by 
means of their multiple holdings across competing firms.  In contrast, in Japan, 
competing banks mostly backed competing large firms within the confines of individual 
                                                                                                                                               
accelerate trends already put in motion by private market forces” (Asia’s New Giant, p. 
47). 
31 For instance, Kawasaki Steel established a close alliance with Daiichi Bank in order 
to finance its ambitious investment plan.  Sumitomo Steel was supported by its keiretsu 
member bank, Sumitomo Bank.  Yawata and Fuji, though they were classified 
independent from keiretsu grouping, strengthened their existing links with Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi keiretsu.  NKK's joining Fuyo group was also driven by financial necessities 
because its affiliated zaibatsu, Asano zaibatsu lacked financial institutions.  See 
Yonekura, op. cit.; Morikawa “The Zaibatsu; and Miyashita and Russel, Keiretsu.   16
keiretsu.  So competition was not restrained, but rather intensified by the banks’ support.  
This explains why the Japanese government continually attempted to arrange cartels to 
aim at controlling ‘excessive competition’. 
By utilizing the keiretsu system and the developmental state, Japan financed its 
industrialization mostly through domestic resource mobilization, with foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign debts negligible in its overall industrial financing.  Japan’s 
foreign debt accounted for only 0.35% of GDP in 1975, even lower than that of the U.S. 
(4.07%), the U.K. (6.33%), France (0.53%), or Germany (0.40%).
32 The ratio of FDI to 
gross capital formation in Japan was only 0.1% during 1970-90, as table 1 shows.  A 
consequence of this nationally-based development supported by bank financing was a 
heavy reliance on debts.  The debt-equity ratio of the manufacturing sector in Japan 
reached nearly 500% at the height of its heavy and chemical industrialization in the 
1970s, as figure 1 shows.  Japan was able to reduce the debt ratios of its corporations 
thereafter but the level remained relatively high when compared to other developed 
countries. 
  
Substituting versus complementing strategies in East Asian NICs 
  When compared to Japan, the East Asian NICs can be regarded as ‘extremely 
backward’ countries at the beginning of their industrialization.
33  Following the 
                                                 
32 IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
33 Among the four East Asian NICs, Hong Kong is not analyzed here mainly because 
we consider it as an exceptional case.  Its industrial growth can be interpreted as a form 
of complementary development like Taiwan or Singapore.  But it was governed by   17
Gerschenkronian pattern, the state was the prime agent in initiating and organizing 
industrialization in these countries, employing a broad range of industrial policy 
measures and continually leading structural changes.
34  Reflecting the new 
technological and international environment in the twentieth century as well as their 
own historical peculiarities, however, there were also some significant differences from 
Gerschenkron’s patterns in the catching-up process of these countries. 
  Korea closely followed the Japanese catching-up model.  Its heavy and chemical 
industrialization programme in the 1970s progressed in the face of strong criticisms and 
skepticisms from international organizations and domestic academics, who viewed 
economic growth of the latecomers primarily in terms of comparative advantage and 
regarded the heavy industries as unsuited to Korea at that stage of development.  
POSCO, the state-owned steel company, faithfully adopted the Nishiyama model by 
building ‘bigger and bigger’ plants and by locating them on the seacoast.
35  Economies 
                                                                                                                                               
Britain, which had little interest in or inclination towards a state-led development of the 
economy, although it suppressed labor movements for security reasons.  Hong Kong 
also enjoyed a monopolistic position in providing a bridge between China and the 
capitalist world.  One consequence of this development pattern was a rapid de-
industrialisation of Hong Kong from the 1980s as it was more and more integrated into 
the Chinese economy. 
34 Refer to Wade, Governing the Market; World Bank, The East Asian Miracle; Rodrik, 
“King Kong”; and Low, The Political Economy. 
35 POSCO, The 20 Years; Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant; Enos and Park, The Adoption and 
Diffusion; Hogan, “South Korean Steel Growth”; and Juhn, “Challenge of a Latecomer”.   18
of scale and modern technology were emphasized in other industries, and “by the end of 
1970s, Korea had the largest textile plant, the largest plywood plant, the largest shipyard, 
the largest cement plant, and the largest heavy machinery plant in the world”.
36  In the 
semiconductor industry, again imitating the Japanese model, Korea focused its 
catching-up effort on DRAMs and outperformed its forerunners in the race of 
continuous R&D and facility investments.
37 
However, reflecting its relative backwardness as compared to Japan, Korea focused 
on narrower segments of the heavy and chemical industries and pursued a more 
unbalanced growth strategy.  POSCO relied mostly on imported facilities in its 
expansion in order to maintain the quality of its products, and gave only minor 
concessions to the persistent requests of the indigenous machinery industry to take part 
in the expansion of POSCO’s mills.  In the semiconductor industry, Korea also 
concentrated on the manufacturing of DRAMs, importing 97% of the equipment and 
90% of raw materials even in 1989 when it was firmly established as a major producer 
of DRAM in the world market.
38  Korea’s strategy was basically to gain international 
competitiveness in assembly businesses first and then spread its competitive strengths 
into backward- or forward-linked industries. 
                                                 
36 Kim, “National System, p. 367. 
37 Refer to Shin, op. cit. and Choi, Dynamic Techno-Management Capability. 
38 In comparison, the Japanese producers reduced the ratio of equipment import from 
70-80% in 1976 to around 50% by 1980 with the VLSI Project.  See Shin, op. cit. p. 
132-33.   19
  Consistent with this dependence on foreign equipment and materials, Korea relied 
heavily on foreign debts.  Japan was able to finance its heavy and chemical 
industrialization mainly with its own domestic resources and export earnings because its 
machinery and material industries had been already developed to a certain level before 
the end of World War II.  But Korea’s domestic resources and export earnings were far 
short of financing its ambitious plan for the heavy and chemical industrialization.  The 
country was also reluctant to attract foreign equity participation as it was pursuing a 
nationalistic substituting strategy.  The assumption of foreign debt was therefore the 
only alternative financing method available in this situation.  As a result, among the 
East Asian NICs, Korea displayed the highest reliance on foreign debt, while the share 
of FDI to gross fixed capital formation was the lowest, as table 1 and table 2 show.  
The basic pillar of this catching-up route was the state-banks-chaebols nexus.  In the 
early 1960s when the country earnestly began industrialization, the state nationalized 
commercial banks and subordinated their lending decisions to industrial policy.  The 
state designated strategic industries and picked out the chaebols, the Korean version of 
family-owned business groups much like the original Japanese zaibatsu, to undertake 
the task of building these new industries.  The state not only provided them with 
subsidies and tariff protection, but also guaranteed their foreign loans.
39  Due to the 
extensive utilization of the banking system for industrial financing as in Japan, the 
period of the HCI was characterized by a jump in the corporate debt-equity ratio, as 
figure 1 shows. 
                                                 
39 See Jones, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship; Amsden, op. cit.; and 
Chang, The Political Economy.   20
For the convenience of our comparison with Taiwan and Singapore below, the 
growth of the chaebols should be given particular attention.  Although they were 
basically children of the state-led heavy and chemical industrialization of the 1970s, 
they rapidly began displaying financial muscle in initiating new large-scale projects, in 
a style not unlike that of the St. Petersburg banks in Russia in the early twentieth 
century.  For instance, the chaebols’ foray into the semiconductor industry in the 1980s 
was a result of oligopolistic competition among them in spite of the initial reluctance of 
the government to support it.
40  The pace of the chaebols’ expansion was partly 
reflected in the phenomenal growth of research and development (R&D) expenditure in 
the private sector, which increased 128 fold from 1976 to 1990.  The public share of 
R&D accordingly dropped from 64% in 1976 to 19% in 1990, a level similar to that in 
Japan.
41  The chaebols securely established themselves as the major promoters of high-
risk projects in Korea in the 1980s. 
  On the other hand, Singapore and Taiwan adopted somewhat different catching-up 
strategies, which can be described as ‘complementing strategies’.  Singapore developed 
mainly through attracting and upgrading multinational companies’ (MNCs) investments 
by providing them with ‘complementary assets’ such as infrastructure, human capital, 
fiscal incentives and so on.  The Singaporean policy-makers were not interested in 
competing with its forerunners, and, instead, attempted to connect the economy directly 
to the ‘First World’.
42  Since its industrialization was spearheaded by MNCs who 
                                                 
40 See Yoon, “Industrial Development”; and Shin, op. cit.. 
41 See Shin, op. cit. and figure 2. 
42 See Lee, From Third World; Mirza, Multinationals and Growth; and Low, op. cit..   21
already had their own technical and financial resources, Singapore did not face pressing 
needs to invest in local innovative capabilities and mobilize financial resources.  
Government-linked companies (GLCs), i.e., public enterprises in Singapore, also filled 
the areas, in which MNCs were not interested but which the Singaporean government 
regarded as strategic to the country’s development, such as shipbuilding, steel-making 
and so on.  As a city-state depending for its survival on trading, Singapore barely had 
room to deploy tariff protection for domestic market.  Among the three East Asian NICs, 
Singapore grew through the most internationalist route towards industrialization. 
Taiwan initially took a nationalistic path of development relying on three pillars, i.e., 
public enterprises, the guangxiqiye (local business groups), and SMEs.  It underwent a 
short period of import-substituting industrialization and imposed heavy regulations on 
FDI.  But it soon shifted to reducing protection and attracting MNCs in order to 
compensate for the lack of big local companies.  The Taiwanese companies have 
seldom attempted to directly compete with their forerunners in Japan or in the U.S..  
The Taiwanese state encouraged and even arranged alliances with MNCs when it felt it 
necessary to venture into high-risk areas like semiconductors.
43  The dominance of 
SMEs and the partnering with MNCs in high-risk projects reduced the need for external 
funding in the course of its industrialization.
44 
                                                 
43 For instance, TSMC, currently the largest semiconductor foundry in the world with 
$5.3 billion of sales in 2000, was set up in 1987 as a joint venture between the 
Taiwanese government (48%), Phillips (27%), local private investors (25%) (Lim and 
Pang, Foreign Direct Investment). 
44 Wade, op. cit.; Whitley, Business Systems; and Fields, Enterprise and the State.   22
  A major factor behind the emergence of the Taiwanese and Singaporean 
complementing strategies was the acceleration of globalization in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.  The global operation of MNCs took off in the 1960s and it has 
become an ever-growing force in shaping the world economy.
45  The beginning of the 
electronics industry in Taiwan and Singapore in the 1960s, which later became the 
largest industry in the both countries, can be attributed to MNCs’ relocation of labor-
intensive production processes to developing countries.
46  At the start, the countries 
provided MNCs mainly with low-wage labor as a complementary asset.  However, as 
MNCs continued to deepen and broaden their global production networks, they 
upgraded and diversified their complementary assets so that MNCs could remain and 
expand in their territories.
47 
  In comparison with the substituting strategy in Korea, a distinctive feature of the 
complementing strategy in Taiwan and Singapore was the state’s continued leading role 
in high-risk projects.  In Korea, the private sector, especially the chaebols, rapidly took 
                                                 
45 Refer to Dicken, Global Shift. 
46 Henderson, The Globalisation of High Technology; and Chen, “The Development of 
Taiwan’s Electronics Industry”. 
47 The beginning of the electronics industry was similar in Korea.  Although the 
consumer electronics like radios and TV sets was under strict import-substituting policy 
regulations, other segments like semiconductors and electronic calculators were 
developed solely for exports without significant linkages to domestic demand.  The 
difference in the Korean case is that the country later pursued vigorous substitution of 
those enclave development items and thereby displaced MNCs with local enterprises.   23
over the leading role in R&D investment from the 1980s, as noted before.  In Taiwan 
and Singapore, however, the growth of private R&D expenditure was far slower than in 
Korea, and the state maintained a crucial role in R&D investment (figure 2).  This was 
because those companies adopting complementing strategies have relatively less 
incentive to invest in R&D as the partnering companies are normally the major source 
of their technological innovation.  Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that 
the latecomers can acquire these high-end capabilities for themselves, and the successes 
of Singapore and Taiwan have in fact hinged on their ability to climb continuously up 
the technology ladder.  However, in comparison with companies adopting substituting 
strategies that are compelled to rapidly build up their own capabilities to compete 
directly with incumbent MNCs, the pace of technology accumulation tends to be slower 
in those adopting complementing strategies.  Therefore, it was imperative for their 
states to play a compensating role adjusting for the relative weakness of the local 
private sector. 
For instance, in entering high-tech industries, Taiwan employed an ‘orderly spin-off 
strategy’.  Public research institutes like ERSO, developed major technologies and set 
up venture companies with combined investments from the government, the private 
sector, and sometimes from foreign companies.
48  Major high-tech venture companies 
were therefore in fact half-public enterprises, despite being formally private companies.  
In Singapore, where investments were spearheaded by MNCs, the local private sector’s 
capability was severely underdeveloped compared to that of Taiwan.  Therefore, when 
Singapore increasingly needed to complement MNC operations with high-end assets as 
                                                 
48 Hou & Gee, “National Systems” and Chen, op. cit..   24
its per capita income approached the level of developed countries, it was the state that 
initiated investment in upgrading local technological capabilities by setting up various 
research institutes, and launching programs to nurture local venture firms, like 
‘Technopreneurship 2000’ and so on.
49 
  However, the complementing strategy has one definite advantage over the 
substituting strategy, that is, it is less risky, as it avoids direct competition with the 
forerunners and spreads financial risks among partners of the equity ownership.  
Therefore, Taiwan and Singapore faced much less urgency in building up domestic 
institutional mechanisms for the large-scale mobilization of financial resources, and 
their banks were less mobilized for industrial financing than their Korean counterparts.  
The result was a relatively low corporate debt-equity ratio in Taiwan or Singapore vis-à-
vis that in Korea.  The ratio for the Taiwanese manufacturing sector was 95.1% on 
                                                 
49 Wong, op. cit.  Similar weaknesses of the local private sector can be found in the 
marketing front.  In Korea, the chaebol-owned general trading companies (GTCs) 
played a pivotal role in export expansion.  The Korean GTCs increased its share of 
country’s exports from 14.0% in 1975 to 47.9% in 1982 while the share of the sogo 
shosha, Japanese GTCs, decreased from 15.6% in 1976 to 7.9% in 1982.  In contrast, 
Singapore’s exports depended predominantly on MNCs’ marketing networks reflecting 
its reliance on MNCs for production activities.  In Taiwan, local trading companies 
accounted for only around 20% of Taiwan’s total trade in the 1980s whilst the Japanese 
sogo shosha kept the central role as the country’s international trading channel, taking 
50% of the total trade. See Cho, The General Trading Company 1986 and Fields, op. 
cit..   25
average during 1974-1995 while that of Korea was 342.20% during the same period, as 
figure 1 shows.  In a study covering the period of 1980-1991, the debt-equity ratio of 
Singapore firms was 123.3% while that of Korean firms was 366.2%.
50  Taiwan and 
Singapore also relied much less on foreign debts than Korea, as table 2 shows.  
 
TRANSITION OF CATCHING-UP ECONOMIES 
  The catching-up system, once established, faces challenges from within.  Successful 
economic growth itself, i.e., increasing maturity of the economy, presses for changes in 
the system.  By its nature, the catching-up system is transitory and never stationary.  If 
the objective of the system, i.e., catching-up, is achieved, the system loses its raison 
d'être.  During the period of catching-up, it should also undergo continual adjustments 
as the gap with the forerunner is narrowed. 
  In Gerschenkron’s schema, the relationship between the state, the financial sector, 
and the industrial sector is governed by the ‘degree of backwardness’, the converse of 
the ‘degree of maturity’.  As the situation of economic backwardness is corrected, the 
relations between those institutions need to undergo changes.  So German industrial 
groups like Siemens or Krupp sought independence from the universal banks as their 
financial and organizational capabilities were strengthened.
51  The Korean chaebols also 
began seeking greater freedom from the government’s tight grip from the 1980s. 
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  For the East Asian countries, these domestic changes coincided with the acceleration 
of globalization.  Although the global operations of MNCs took off in the 1960s, it was 
in the 1980s, when the East Asian countries established themselves as successful 
catching-up countries, that the pace of globalization gained a decisive acceleration.  
Anglo-American countries like the U.S. and the U.K. initiated a fuller liberalization of 
their domestic economies and pushed for further liberalization of international trade and 
finance from the 1980s.  And the wave of liberalization spread to other developed 
countries and also to developing countries. 
  Despite the fact that the three East Asian NICs were equally successful in their 
industrializations until the 1980s, the challenges from maturity and the acceleration of 
globalization affected them unevenly.
52   
  First, differences in the state-finance-industry relations brought about different 
requirements for institutional adjustment.  In Taiwan and Singapore, countries adopting 
a complementing strategy, the financial sector was not extensively mobilized for 
industrial financing, their states relying more on fiscal policies like tax breaks and high 
                                                 
52 The case of Japan is not discussed in this section mainly for convenience of 
comparison since its stage of development is different from East Asian NICs, though 
the country, as an exponent of the substituting strategy, shares many similarities with 
Korea such as a greater need to adjust the relations between the banks and industrial 
companies.   27
depreciation allowances to achieve the necessary stimulus for further investment.
53 
Therefore, the relation between the financial sector and the industrial sector did not 
need a large-scale transformation as their economies matured.  The financial sectors of 
those countries had been already characterized by extreme conservatism and their 
lending decisions were more autonomous than that in Korea.  What was required of 
them was the overall upgrading of their capabilities as their economies grew and 
became more complex, not a radical adjustment in their relations with the industrial 
sector.  Likewise, the relation between the state and the private industrial sector in these 
countries did not need to undergo extensive adjustments.  Their local capitalists 
remained relatively weak and the role of the state still lay basically in promoting them.  
The states of Taiwan and Singapore have even strengthened their promotional role in 
new high-risk industries.  In this milieu, there was little need of anti-trust regulations. 
  In contrast, Korea faced greater strains in the state-banks-chaebols nexus as its 
economy became mature.  The extensive mobilization of the banking sector for 
industrial expansion resulted in a high portion of policy loans in total loans.
54 As the 
interaction between finance and the industry became more complex as economic 
maturity advanced, the Korean banks needed to gain more autonomy in their lending 
                                                 
53 It of course allocated policy loans, but they “were broadly targeted to support exports 
or anti-inflationary import package ... and industry-specific loans were rare”.  See 
Cheng, “Guarding the Commanding Height”, p. 56. 
54 Policy loan in Korea therefore constituted more than 40% of total domestic loan even 
in 1993 when the country already began opening its financial markets.  See World Bank, 
The East Asian Miracle, p. 309.    28
decisions and the state was required to relinquish many of its previous direct controls 
over the financial sector while strengthening its financial supervisory role.  The state-
chaebols relation also needed to undergo change.  As the chaebols grew, the Korean 
state was required to play a double role.  It had to maintain some promotional role since 
the country was still in a catching-up stage while, at the same time, it needed to regulate 
the increasing dominance of the chaebols within the domestic economy.  The Korean 
state strengthened anti-trust regulations from the early 1980s and ‘the chaebol issue’ has 
been one of the most thorny policy issues in Korea since then.  
  Secondly, the acceleration of globalization posed different challenges to the 
relationship between MNCs and local firms within the three East Asian NICs.  With the 
acceleration of globalization, those companies that adopted a substituting strategy were 
under more pressure to transform themselves into full-fledged MNCs.  They were 
required to carry out heavy investments to protect their local markets from the entrance 
of competing MNCs, on the one hand, and to penetrate foreign markets in order to 
capture new opportunities, on the other.  The investments of the Korean chaebols’ in the 
mid-1990s, which have been often criticized as ‘over-investment’ following the 
financial crisis of 1997, can be understood in this context.  The latecomer firms 
adopting the complementing strategy in Taiwan and Singapore were also required to 
restructure their operations in line with the re-organization and changing needs of their 
partnering MNCs, but their task was not so tough as that of firms pursuing substituting 
strategies. 
Thirdly, there were differences among the three countries in managing financial risks 
arising from the acceleration of financial globalization.  Korea had, proportionally, 
larger foreign and corporate debts than Taiwan and Singapore.  It was able to maintain   29
these relatively high levels of debts with the help of the government’s control of cross-
border capital flows and the commercial banks’ willingness to keep providing the 
corporate sector with loans.  But financial globalization weakened the government’s 
capacity to control capital flows.  The room for ‘patient’ money was also reduced as 
local firms were more broadly exposed to international financial markets.  Financial 
liberalization in a country with relatively high exposure to foreign debts had to be 
paralleled by the construction of a system to manage the level and structure of debts as 
well as to protect the economy from the volatility of the international capital flows.  In 
contrast, the relatively low levels of foreign and corporate debt in Singapore and 
Taiwan were a factor that made them less vulnerable to financial shocks.  
There were certainly other factors explaining why Korea fell into financial crisis in 
1997 while Taiwan and Singapore did not.  But, if we compare the catching-up 
strategies and the consequent institutional structures of those countries, the greater 
challenges posed to Korea by economic maturity and the acceleration of globalization 
are to be noted.  The financial crisis showed that Korea failed in surmounting these 
challenges.
55 
However, this is not to argue that the financial crisis was an inevitable consequence 
of the Korean path to industrial development.  There is no such thing as necessity in 
history.  The previous discussion does no more than point out the fact that, at some 
historical junctures, some countries are relatively disadvantaged in coping with new 
challenges while others are less disadvantaged.  After all, as Gerschenkron emphasizes, 
the challenges to latecomers always look formidable and catching-up commences when 
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they overcome obstacles with their own creativity.  Bigger challenges can be countered 
by greater creativity. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the fact that comparative advantage for the latecomers lies in labor-intensive 
industries, the Gerschenkronian catching-up strategy of building ‘bigger and bigger’ 
plants re-appears time and again, as we have seen from the cases of Japan and Korea.  
This is because, in the industries that require heavy capital investment and whose 
production processes are tightly integrated geographically, this kind of leapfrogging 
strategy provides the latecomers with a better chance to gain competitive edge against 
their forerunners.  It is not simply ‘a quest for prestige’ or a result of ‘economic 
megalomania’, but is based on a sound economic calculation.  A more intriguing 
question for the latecomers would lie in the degree of necessity and willingness to 
compete in these industries, which varies greatly according to the historical situation of 
individual countries.  In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Germany and Russia 
wanted and needed to compete with Britain, and the focus on the heavy industries was a 
suitable technique for achieving this ambition since they were the most technologically 
dynamic industries of the day.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, we 
see the emergence of new industries like the electronics industry, which are 
technologically dynamic but whose production processes can be spatially separated.  
And some latecomers did not have a compelling need or desire to directly compete with 
their forerunners.  We have in the above explained the deviations from Gerschenkronian 
pattern in East Asia in view of these newly emerged factors, and investigated different 
paths of transition between substituting and complementing models of catching-up.   31
It would be a matter of further research to probe the feasibility of the two catching-up 
strategies for the current latecomers.  In the 1960s when the East Asian NICs began 
their industrialization, the complementing strategy was an exception among developing 
countries.  However, it has been increasingly treated as a norm for late industrialization 
by many scholars and international institutions as the globalization tendency accelerated 
in the 1980s and 1990s.
56 The substituting strategy appears to have lost credibility in 
proportion. 
But it should be noted that this strategy worked quite well for Japan until it became a 
fully developed country and for Korea at least until it reached the level of a middle-
income country.  It is also not improbable that the current trend of globalization can be 
reversed in the future, as happened with the earlier episode of globalization that was 
followed by the period of the Great Depression in the 1930s, and more nationalistic 
models of late industrialization may regain their vogue in the future.  Even if the current 
pace of globalization is maintained, some reservations remain in regards the general 
utility of the complementing strategy. 
First, there are business areas within which the MNCs are not interested in relocating 
or outsourcing to the latecomers but in which the latter may find great potential for 
growth.  In deciding on the catching-up strategies, therefore, a crucial question is posed: 
how sufficient a specialization in the complementary areas that can match MNCs’ needs 
will be available for the latecomers in meeting their needs of economic growth?  The 
answer will be ultimately determined by the size of the market created by the 
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international subcontracting network at any given time.  The size of countries concerned 
will also be a factor.  For bigger countries, engaging only in the complementary areas to 
MNCs may not suffice to attain a desirable rate of economic growth.  For smaller 
countries, it should be relatively easier to achieve a desirable rate of economic growth 
through specializing in limited areas.  As the Taiwanese case shows, this scope has been 
greatly expanded with the acceleration of globalization.  But it remains to be seen 
whether it will work for bigger countries like Korea, China and so on. 
Secondly, there may be limits to growth through complementing strategy above a 
certain level of development. As an economy grows and its production costs rise, it 
should keep moving to higher value-added products.  But it may be the case that the 
scope for this upgrading is reduced if the economy sticks to the path of complementary 
development since it makes less economic sense for MNCs to part with their higher-end 
capabilities.  For instance, one reason why MNCs globalize their operations is to recoup 
on the rapidly increasing costs involved in developing new technologies.
57  In this 
respect, the core R&D capability is the last thing MNCs will transfer and there is no 
complementary asset latecomers can provide to attain this capability.  So a 
complementing strategy may have to be followed by a ‘delayed substituting strategy’ at 
some stage of development.  It seems that the acceleration of globalization has enabled 
the latecomers to postpone the need to adopt a substituting strategy to a later stage of 
development, rather than rendering such a strategy unnecessary. 
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Table 1. Ratio of FDI inflows to Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
in Selected East Asian countries, 1971-1997 
(%) 
 
Country  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-1997 
       
Japan  0.1  0.1  0.2 
       
Hong Kong  5.1  9.9  8.7 
Republic of Korea  1.2  0.9  1.0 
Singapore  15.8  26.2  25.9 
Taiwan   1.3  1.3  2.7 
 





Figure 1. Trend of Debt-Equity Ratio in Japanese,  












Source: Bureau of Statistics (Japan), BOK website 
 Bank of China, Taiwan (1999), Fields (1995)  
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Figure 2. Public Share of R&D in Total R&D Investment 
In Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
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Table 2. External Debt to GDP Ratios of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
(%, Selected years) 
 
 
  1976  1982  1985  1993  1996  1997 
Korea  36.7  52.0  52.1  12.7  20.2  25.5 
Taiwan  13.6  12.8  14.5    7.6    8.0    9.3 
Singaopre    22.0  22.8   9.5  10.7  16.5 
 
Source: BOK, OECD (1986; 1999, website), IMF (2000)  